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Beautiful people earn more. Surprisingly, this premium is larger for men than for 
women and is independent of the degree of customer contact. Overlooked is the 
possibility that beauty can influence college admissions. We explore this academic 
contributor to the labor market beauty earnings premium by sampling 1,800 social 
media profiles of students from universities ranked from 1 to 200 in China and the 
US. Chinese universities use only standardized test scores for admissions. In 
contrast, US universities use also grades and extracurricular activities, which are 
not necessarily beauty-blind. Consistent with beauty-blind admissions, alumni’s 
beauty is uncorrelated with the rank of college attended in China. In the US, White 
men from higher ranked colleges are better-looking. As expected, the correlation is 
insignificant for White men who attended tech colleges and is highest for those who 
attended private colleges. We also find that White women and minorities of either 
gender are not better-looking at higher ranked colleges. Our evidence indicates a 
college admissions contribution to the labor market beauty premium for US White 
men, but not for students in China of either gender, White women, or minorities of 
either gender in the US, or for White men who attended technology colleges. We 
discuss the college admissions preference for athletes as a potential channel for the 
positive correlation we find between college and beauty rank for White men. 
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1 Introduction 
Beautiful people earn more. Such is the conclusion of a burgeoning literature initiated by Biddle 
and Hamermesh (1994). Surprisingly, beauty seems to matter more for men than for women, and 
in most jobs, instead of being limited to those with extensive dealings with customers who might 
indulge a taste for beauty. (See A-Table 1 in the Appendix for a summary of the beauty premium 
for men and women across studies.) To explain these unexpected findings, several authors have 
proposed employer discrimination through the channel of human resource (HR) managers as a 
potential cause. However, overlooked is the possibility that part of the labor market beauty 
premium originates prior to the labor market, specifically in the college admissions process, within 
which the discretion of teachers, guidance counselors, and admissions officers to discriminate, are 
comparable to that of HR managers. In fact, colleges seem to do precisely that when seeking talent 
in “leadership, performing arts, or athletics”, all factors which can be influenced by popularity, 
and hence, potentially by beauty among high school students.1 In the case of the election of high 
school students to leadership positions, beauty may the crucial factor considering that the voting 
public (Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2010) and even Ph.D. economists (Hamermesh 2006) 
exhibit a bias for beauty in the election of their leaders. 
We test for this potential college admissions contribution to the labor market beauty premium 
by sampling 1,800 online social media profiles across a wide range of universities (ranked 1−200) 
in China and in the US. Given that US universities use extracurricular activities and grades in the 
decision to admit students (Green, Jaschik, and Lederman 2011), we hypothesize that the beauty 
rank of alumni may increase the rank of the university they attended in the US. In contrast, Chinese 
universities use standardized test scores almost exclusively to admit students (Bai and Chi 2014; 
Li et al. 2012; Yang 2014). 2 Despite the shortcomings of such an admissions system in terms of 
the stress it imposes on students (Cai et al. 2019), it is beauty-blind. Moreover, in light of a recent 
 
1 According to a recent New York Times article (Cain 2017), ‘Harvard’s application informs students that its mission is “to educate our students 
to be citizens and citizen-leaders for society.” Yale’s website advises applicants that it seeks “the leaders of their generation”. On Princeton’s site, 
“leadership activities” are first among equals on a list of characteristics for would-be students to showcase. Even Wesleyan, known for its artistic 
culture, was found by one study to evaluate applicants based on leadership potential…Whatever the colleges’ intentions, the pressure to lead now 
defines and constricts our children’s adolescence….It seemed no activity or accomplishment meant squat unless it was somehow connected to 
leadership.’ 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/opinion/sunday/not-leadership-material-good-the-world-needs-followers.html?_r=1 2 A number of top-tier universities in China admit some outstanding students, e.g., winners of international mathematics competitions through 
special channels that involve the university’s own admissions exams, followed by oral exam type interviews. However, details on the policies for 
specific universities are not publicly available.  
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large sample study of twins which finds no relationship between facial attractiveness and 
intelligence (Mitchem et al. 2015), we expect no association between the beauty rank of alumni 
and the rank of the university they attended in China, because of factors correlated with intelligence, 
which we expect to increase with school rank. 
Our hypothesis for China is confirmed: the facial beauty of Chinese students of either gender is 
uncorrelated with the rank of the college they attended. Our hypothesis for the US is confirmed 
only for White men (74% of our male sample). Only their facial beauty increases with the rank of 
college attended.  
We test further the hypothesis that reliance on standardized tests diminishes the association 
between the beauty rank of alumni and the rank of the college attended that we find for White men 
by checking for variation in the magnitude of the correlation across different types of colleges. We 
separate our sample of White men according to whether they attended private, public, or 
technology colleges. Compared to public colleges, private colleges can rely less on standardized 
tests and more on discretionary criteria than public colleges, because they are less regulated. As 
expected, the association between facial beauty and the rank of the college attended is stronger for 
private colleges. On the other hand, technology colleges should attach more weight to technical 
ability as indicated by standardized test scores than non-technology colleges.3 Accordingly, we 
find that the association between beauty and the rank of the college attended is insignificant for 
alumni of technology colleges. Thus, reliance on standardized tests appears to suppress the 
correlation between the beauty of White men and the rank of their alma mater, while discretion in 
admissions criteria increases it. 
Our finding that the beauty of both genders in China, White women and non-White minorities 
of both genders in the US, and White men in tech colleges, is not associated with the rank of their 
college supports prior evidence that beauty is uncorrelated with intelligence. Our contribution to 
this literature on the association between intelligence and beauty is to provide further evidence 
against an association between beauty and general academic ability, as captured through the 
variation in the rank of colleges. For our sample of US White women and non-White minorities of 
 
3 A former director of admissions at Dartmouth, an elite private college, revealed that it was very difficult to choose from among the many 
academically well-qualified candidates of the two thousand applications she read per year (Sabky 2017). In her view, personal essays by the 
candidate and letters of recommendation from illustriousness mentors are generally uninformative. Rather, she must resort to idiosyncratic signals 
such as “inappropriate email addresses”, behavior on a campus visit, or an unusual recommender—in the case of the article--the janitor of the 
student’s high school. Additionally, she sometimes give those signals greater priority than standardized test scores in her admissions decision. See: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/opinion/check-this-box-if-youre-a-good-person.html?mtrref=query.nytimes.com&assetType=opinion 
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both genders, we also provide evidence that beauty is not associated with non-academic criteria, 
e.g., leadership qualities for both genders and athletic ability for women, that US colleges also use 
for admitting students.  
We check for the simple association between the rank of the college attended and post-
graduation wages to get a sense of the potential economic importance of the college admissions 
contribution to the labor market beauty premium for White men. For this sample of subjects, a one 
percentage point increase in beauty rank corresponds to a half college rank increase in the rank of 
the college attended. This correspondence translates in to a roughly three percent decrease in salary 
10 years after graduation for a 10 percent decrease in beauty rank.  
The association between beauty and earnings for White men that we find is of a similar 
magnitude to that previously found for the labor market beauty premium, which ranges from 5-20 
percent for the coarser measure of below, at, or above average looks (A-Table 1). In principle, it 
is possible for the variation in the beauty of White men to be of comparable magnitude because, 
while these previous studies of the labor market beauty premium do control for years of education, 
they do not control for the rank of college among those who graduated from college.  
We contribute to the literature on the labor market beauty premium by providing evidence which 
suggests a college admission contribution to the labor market beauty earnings premium for men in 
the US, who are mostly White. 4  This college admissions contribution may help explain the 
surprisingly greater labor market beauty premium for men in the US, and why it does not vary 
across jobs with significant and insignificant exposure to customers. Our evidence suggests that 
the labor market beauty premium for men and women in China (Deng, Li, and Zhou 2019; Gu and 
Ji 2019; Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang 2002; Maurer-Fazio and Lei 2015) and for women and 
non-Whites of both genders in the US may arise after college. Our results also suggest the potential 
importance of controlling not only for the years of education in future studies of the labor market 
beauty premium, but also for the rank of the college attended, particularly for men in the US. 
Section 2 reviews a few of the many studies on the beauty premium in the labor market as well 
as the small number of studies in the educational context. Section 3 elaborates on our methods for 
the collection of photos and rating of photos from social media profiles. Section 4 explains our  
 
 
 
Page 4 
two-stage regression strategy, where we use the residuals from the first-stage regression of beauty 
ratings on such factors as age and race as the basis for our second-stage regression of college rank 
on beauty rank. Section 5 summarizes our results, discusses potential confounders, and outlines 
the literature on the favoritism shown towards athletes in college admissions in the US, which may 
help explain our finding that only White men’s beauty rank increases with the rank of the college 
they attended.  
2 Review of labor market studies on the labor market beauty premium 
Several empirical studies have demonstrated a robust labor market beauty premium for workers 
around the world and in various sectors beginning with the seminal work of Biddle and 
Hamermesh (1994). The theories of labor market discrimination by beauty parallel those of other 
forms of labor market discrimination, e.g., by race. These fall under two broad categories: taste-
based discrimination (Becker 1971), where the discriminated characteristic, in this case, beauty, 
enters directly into the utility function, and productivity-based or statistical discrimination (Arrow 
1973), where the observable characteristic, also beauty, is correlated with the characteristic that 
that influences productivity. As an example of the taste-based discrimination, customers, e.g., 
purchasers of fashion magazines, can derive utility directly from better-looking workers. As an 
example of the latter statistical discrimination, employers may discriminate by hiring good-looking 
people because beauty signals pleasant manners and good social skills, which are not as 
immediately observable as beauty. Employers may value such skills because they either increase 
customer satisfaction or the productivity of other workers. Alternatively, consumers can use beauty 
to infer other characteristics, e.g., competence in doctors, because of a possible statistical 
relationship between beauty and cognitive and non-cognitive skills. 
Since the inception of the literature, a notable and surprisingly larger beauty premium/plainness 
penalty has existed for men than for women (Borland and Leigh 2014; Doorley and Sierminska 
2015; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Harper 2000; Mocan and Tekin 2010). Moreover, the 
importance of looks as revealed through employer surveys on the amount of interaction with 
customers show little explanatory power for the cross-sectional beauty premium (Doorley and 
Sierminska 2015; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). See A-Table 1 in the Appendix. While the 
constancy of the beauty premium across jobs can be explained by employer discrimination, that 
would not seem to predict a larger premium for men than for women. 
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These unexpected findings highlight other potential problems in identifying the source of the 
labor market beauty premium. Other factors can increase a person’s ability to make themselves 
more beautiful, which, in turn, increases their wages. For example, intelligence, which is generally 
associated with productivity in most jobs, can potentially increase the skill with which flattering 
clothes (which has been shown to add to the income of women (Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang 
2002)) are chosen. Alternatively, intelligence can free up more time from other tasks with which 
to choose these clothes. Intelligence can also increase confidence, which may enhance the 
impression a person makes, e.g., if confidence in one’s ability makes one smile more easily, and 
if smiling enhances attractiveness. Accordingly, more intelligent workers can appear more 
attractive, thereby earning higher wages, although they are not necessarily more physically 
attractive. Customers may not derive utility from the exceptional intelligence of those workers. 
Instead, these customers can derive utility from the friendliness of more confident workers, e.g., 
in a restaurant host/hostess.  
Aside from intelligence, a myriad of other factors related to productivity including health and 
family income can conceivably contribute to both the beauty of workers and their wages. Thus, 
important confounders for both taste-based and statistical discrimination for the labor market 
beauty premium exist. In addition to the identification problems, the gender difference in 
significance can also be due to out-selection by attractive/unattractive women from the labor 
market, which again, is difficult to control for in empirical studies of the labor market.  
To minimize the effects of statistical discrimination and out-selection, several researchers in the 
beauty premium literature used CV correspondence studies of employers. These correspondence 
studies are widely used to explore ethnic and gender discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2004). Such studies with employers can decrease the effects of these confounders through random 
assignment of beauty to the characteristics associated with beauty, e.g., intelligence, which is 
signaled by education in the CVs. Confirming prior empirical findings of a beauty premium, a CV 
correspondence study in Argentina finds that distorted photos of real people designed to make 
them ugly were much less likely to obtain a callback López et al. (2013). With the exception of 
the pronounced premium for better-looking women in office support, receptionist, and customer 
service jobs, the authors ascertained roughly the same positive premium for both genders across 
jobs, irrespective of the degree of customer contact.  
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A significant premium across all four occupations was observed in China, including areas such 
as software engineering, which has minimal customer contact (Maurer-Fazio and Lei 2015). A 
correspondence study in Israel using resumes with randomized photos of applicants with varying 
beauty shows that only better-looking men were more likely to receive a callback to a job 
application, whereas women suffered a beauty penalty in terms of callback rates, and even in jobs 
which, as the authors point out, beauty plays no obvious role: accounts management, budgeting, 
industrial engineering, and computer programming (2015).  
However, despite the many positive findings on labor market discrimination by beauty, the 
existing literature has largely ignored the possibility that the beauty premium may begin before 
entry into the labor market. 5  The source of the beauty premium is important both to better 
understand labor market discrimination and also to better target antidiscrimination regulations 
based on personal appearance. Such legislation has already been enacted in some states and 
proposed elsewhere (Hamermesh 2011; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).  
The advantage of our study with respect to identification problems in the empirical and CV 
correspondence study literature is that we look only at the relation between beauty (as rated by 
impartial observers) and general labor market productivity traits, as revealed by college rankings. 
Our raters are neither employers nor customers, either of whom might have a taste for beauty 
within particular industries (e.g., for very thin women in the modeling industry) or be concerned 
with unobserved productivity-related traits correlated with beauty. Thus, neither taste-based nor 
statistical discrimination by customers or employers are relevant to this study. Additionally, given 
that the profiles rated here are from pre-labor market university students, they are also less likely 
to be biased by those individuals who have systematically selected out of the sample by beauty for 
opportunities in the marriage market.  
Few studies in economics are available regarding the relation between academic performance 
and beauty. Grade point average is predicted by physical attractiveness for grade school students 
of both genders in England (Hansen 2016) and for female but not for male students upon entering 
high school (French et al. 2009). However, the association between attractiveness and grade point 
 
5 Many studies exist on the correlates of beauty in educational settings in the psychology literature. Physically attractive students receive higher 
grades in high school and college (French et al. 2009). Attractive individuals are consistently perceived or judged more favorably than the 
unattractive in a number of dimensions, including intelligence, academic potential, grades, confidence, extroversion, and various social skills 
(Jackson, Hunter, and Hodge 1995; Mobius and Rosenblat 2006; Ritts, Patterson, and Tubbs 1992). These studies suggest that beauty is believed 
to be correlated with these traits. However, they do not control for these traits in their identification of beliefs. Thus, they failed to demonstrate that 
beauty causes the beauty premium in the labor market.  
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average becomes negative for males and insignificant for females when personality and grooming 
are controlled for (French et al. 2009). Facial attractiveness in high school can account for the 
attractiveness premium up to the mid-30s (Scholz and Sicinski 2015). Within an elite women’s 
liberal arts college, a negative correlation was found between beauty and academic productivity-
related traits, as measured by SAT scores (Deryugina and Shurchkov 2015). No correlation was 
found between beauty and productivity-related traits among lawyers who graduated from one law 
school (Biddle and Hamermesh 1998) and among experimental subjects (Mobius and Rosenblat 
2006). Most importantly, with respect to our hypothesis, these prior studies either of single 
colleges, or if not, they did not test for the effect of the subject’s beauty or its correlates on the 
rank of the subject’s alma mater. Consequently, they do not rule out that the labor market beauty 
premium in terms earnings was due to a potential bias in the college application process. 
3 Methodology 
We randomly selected 30 universities in China and the US ranked from 1 to 200. Each selected 
college has similar rankings in at least two commonly used ranking systems. The rankings for US 
colleges include the U.S. News & World Report Ranking,6 the Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU), 7 whereas the Chinese University Alumni Alliance Ranking (CUAA)8 and 
the Wu Shulian’s Chinese University Rankings9 are for Chinese colleges. College rankings are 
shown in the A-Table 2 in the Appendix. 
We randomly sampled 30 profiles (15 for each gender) for each college on Facebook. In the US, 
72 percent of college students have a profile on Facebook.10 We used the social media site Renren 
in China, which had a reported membership of 280 million in 2013.11 In both services, users can 
create profiles for free with photos, other images, list of personal interests, contact information, 
accounts of memorable life events, and other personal information, such as educational 
background and employment status. Registration on the two social media sites requires filling in: 
name, gender, and email address or phone number. Renren also requires a birth date and 
 
6 http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/data 
7 http://www.shanghairanking.com/World-University-Rankings-2015/USA.html 
8 http://www.cuaa.net/cur/2015/index_700  
9 http://edu.qq.com/zt2013/2013wsl/ 
10 http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users/ 
11 Renren is the Facebook analog for college students in China, as Facebook is blocked by the Chinese Government.  
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educational information (either high school or college). The educational information of a Renren 
account can also be “verified” by a college IP address or the college email. Such verification is 
indicated in the profile. We used only such verified accounts. A user is also required to upload a 
personal photo for the profile picture.  
After registration, users can add other users as “friends” with whom they can share their profile 
content. Users can also join common-interest user groups which are organized by workplace, 
college, or other categories. Users determine who can browse their pages or receive their updates 
with their privacy settings. On both websites, users can make their profile “public,” (anyone with 
a membership can see their profile) or “open to friends” (only “friends” can see their profile) or 
“private” (only the user themselves can view their profile). Both websites allow users to search for 
public profiles with specific educational backgrounds.  
Search engines generally employ confidential proprietary algorithms to enhance the efficiency 
of searches. To avoid any unobserved influences from such algorithms on our results, we selected 
the profile photo based on random numbers from 1 to 200 generated prior to our searches. We 
refer to these numbers as the ‘display rank’. Hence, if we drew a number 67, we would select the 
67th profile in the search engine results and that profile photo would have a display rank of 67. We 
drew two sets of random numbers: the second to be used in cases where the profile indicated by 
the first number did not have the required information or photo quality.12 We refer to the first 
number drawn as the ‘original’ display rank. Each selected profile was that of a student who 
graduated from the college as an undergraduate in 2012. The profile photo must be a clear color 
front-view photo without any head covering. Other people or backgrounds in the photos were 
cropped to highlight the face of the subject. We paid raters (5 RMB/100 pairs in China and 0.75 
USD/100 pairs in the US) to evaluate all profile photos using a proprietary beauty rating program, 
which they could access through a standard web browser.13  
The rating program matched each photo randomly with 10 other photos of the same gender in 
the same country. 4,500 photo pairs are generated for each gender in each country. We used 
multiple raters to rate the same photo. In the US, each photo was rated 12−37 times by US raters, 
with a mean of 22 times. In China, each photo was rated 12−28 times, with a mean of 20 times. 
 
12 These criteria are available on request. 
13 At the time of writing, the exchange rate was 1 USD for 6.5 RMB. Given the few minutes it takes to rate all 100 photos, our payment was 
relatively high for both Mechanical Turk and China. A high wage was set to attract sufficient numbers of raters in a short time span.  
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Such rating frequencies are comparable to other studies (Deryugina and Shurchkov 2015). The 
final rating for each photo is based on the average rating of all raters of that photo. In total, 90 
Chinese raters (60 male) rated all 900 Chinese photos, and 103 US raters (49 males, 86 White) 
rated all 900 US photos. The Chinese raters were graduate students recruited from the Peking 
University HSBC School of Business through a mass email. The US raters were recruited through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, a project-based employment service offered by Amazon.  
We also hired an additional 27 US raters to categorize the race (White, Black, Hispanic, and 
Asian) and age ranges (age categories: 23−26 and 27 or older) of all US photos. Chinese students 
are almost always of the Han majority and within the 23−26 age range because they rarely take 
time off before college.14 Each US rater was asked to categorize 100 US photos. Each US photo 
was categorized once each by three different US raters. The final race and age categories of the 
US photos were determined by the ratings of the US majority raters, i.e., two or three out of three. 
The results of the race and age categorization for the US sample are shown in Table 1. 
Raters were asked to choose the more physically attractive within each pair. Instead of asking 
raters for a numerical rating within a certain range of numbers, as is standard in the field 
(Hamermesh and Biddle 1994), we followed the methodology in Ong, Yang, and Zhang (2020) 
asked raters to decide only which photo of a pair is better-looking. Such a judgment may be easier 
and more precise than assigning a number to indicate how good-looking someone is according to 
a subjective numerical scale (Negahban, Oh, and Shah 2012).  
Numerical beauty ratings can cluster around specific numbers, e.g., 7 or 8 out of 10. A given 
subject may not be consistent in their beauty ratings across a number of photos, because of fatigue, 
lapses in memory, or because their subjective reference benchmark level of beauty changes as they 
rate photos. In contrast, binary decisions require discerning only the minimal difference in beauty 
between two photos in side-by-side comparison. Subjects do not need to strain their memory to 
maintain the consistency of the ratings for photos with similar beauty, if these photos happen to 
have many other intervening photos. With a binary comparison, the accuracy of a subject’s 
memory is no longer an issue. The binary decision also avoids potential scale differences across 
individuals, genders, and countries (e.g., where Chinese females choose higher numbers than 
American male raters), which can add noise to the data.  
 
14 The Han race constitutes 91 percent of the population of China, See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_minorities_in_China. The share of 
Hans is likely even higher among university students. 
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To deal with these sources of noise, prior studies coarsen their 1-7 scale data into three categories: 
below, at, or above average beauty. However, this may sacrifice the precision we exploit to 
establish our hypotheses below. Lastly, our reliance on the binary choices of raters means that our 
beauty ranking is a relative ranking within the sample, not a potentially out of sample/absolute 
ranking against unobserved subjective protypes of beauty that the subject has in mind and uses as 
a benchmark.  
The software we developed aggregates the ratings for each photo into a continuous number, 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜, between 0 percent (least attractive) and 100 percent (most attractive) using the well-
established Bradley–Terry model for aggregating binary comparisons into a percentile (Bradley 
and Terry 1952). For each photo, 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜ represents the percent of other photos that reviewers on 
average found less attractive than subject 𝑖. Table 2 shows the summary statics for our sample. We 
find that White men (0.52) and women (0.52) have higher ratings than non-Whites (0.43, 0.45). 
This may be due to a within-race preference, found in prior studies (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely 
2010b), among our Amazon Mechanical Turk raters, who are likely to be mostly White.   
Before we study the effect of beauty rank on college rank, we first remove the effect of other 
factors on the beauty ratings of subjects by regressing 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜ on the display rank of profile 𝑖 and 
the dummy variable, 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙௜, which takes on the value of 1 if the original display rank was used 
to harvest the profile or 0 if the display rank was a redrawn random number.15 This first-stage 
regression specification is  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜  = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵ(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜) + 𝛽ଶ(𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙௜) + 𝜀 Eq. (1) 
For the US photos, we also include an age category dummy and race dummies (based on the age 
attributed by a separate group of raters).  
For this first-stage regression, we find, consistent with Bruch and Newman’s (2018) important 
study of online dating preferences, non-White men are less attractive than White. We find this 
difference to be insignificant for Black and Hispanic men, but this may be due to our small sample 
size. However, we do find that Asian men, for whom our sample size is slightly larger, are 16 
percentage points less attractive (-0.16) than White men. Also, we find in column (2), consistent 
with Bruch and Newman, that women who are judged older than 27 (-0.05) or are Black (-0.18) 
are less attractive. However, unlike Bruch and Newman, we find that Asian women, who they find 
 
15 We must remove the effect of age before we regress college rank on beauty to avoid including the coefficient of the subject’s age on the rank 
of the college attended, which is not of interest to our study.  
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to be most attractive, are deemed less attractive than White women in our study. This difference 
may be due to their sample, which included subjects with only high school or post graduate 
education, being more heterogenous in terms of educational attainment than our sample. The 
insignificant and zero coefficient for display rank in columns (1)-(3) indicate Facebook does not 
rank profiles by factors which are correlated with attractiveness, e.g., popularity. In contrast, the 
negative and significant coefficient for display rank in columns (4)-(6) indicates that profiles that 
were further down the page in the search engine results of Renren are slightly less attractive.  
[Insert Table 3] 
From each of these regressions in Table 3, which are separated by gender per country, we derive 
a set of residual ratings, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜. This separation of residuals per gender per country 
allows us to control for potential heterogenous effects of age, race, or even display rank on the 
residual of the rating per country. For easier exposition, we invert the residual rating by taking the 
negative value of it. We also add a constant of 0.5, which was removed from the residuals in the 
first-stage regression. Thus, our independent variable for the second stage regression is the beauty 
percentile rank (henceforth, ‘beauty rank’): 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ = −𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜ + 0.5. In this 
form, smaller numerical values of beauty rank denote more beautiful individuals (i.e., higher 
beauty rank), just as smaller numerical values of college rank denote greater prestige (i.e., higher 
college rank). Thus, we can avoid the inconvenience for our readers of interpreting a negative sign 
for our main findings.  
For our main results, we estimate the effect of 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ on 𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜, 𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵ(𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜) + 𝜀 Eq. (2) 
where 𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ is the log of the rank of the college that subject 𝑖 attended. We choose the 
log of the college rank because we expect that the pool of applicants available to higher ranked 
colleges is larger than that available to lower ranked colleges. Therefore, higher ranked colleges 
can afford to, and indeed, may need to be choosier by soft/discretionary criteria in filling their 
incoming class. Moreover, we also expect that the marginal value of an increase in rank for 
applicants to high ranked colleges (e.g., going from second to first) to be larger than for low ranked 
colleges (e.g., going from top-200 to top-199). Both effects would create increasing returns to 
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selectivity by the correlates of beauty for higher ranked colleges which the log of the college rank 
would partially compensate for.16  
4 Results 
Table 4 displays the effect of the beauty rank on the log college rank. Columns (1)-(2) show that 
the coefficients for men (0.08) and for women (-0.03) in China are close to zero and not significant. 
Column (3) indicates that they are not significantly different from each other.  
Observation I. The beauty rank of alumni of either gender in China has no economically or 
statistically significant association to the rank of the college attended.  
Column (4) reveals that the coefficients men (0.64) in the US is significant and positive, while 
column (5) reveals that the coefficient for women is small (-0.02) and not significantly different 
from zero. Column (6) indicates that the coefficient for women is not significantly different from 
the men’s. This lack of significance is most likely because the standard error for the coefficient of 
women’s beauty rank is large.  
Observation II. The beauty rank of male alumni but not female alumni in the US increases on 
the rank of the college attended. 
Translating these results back to the original non-log college rank, in the case of US men, the 
constant of 3.82 implies that when the beauty rank is highest (i.e., 0), the college rank is 𝑒ଷ.଼ଶ =47. When the beauty rank is lowest (i.e., 100), the college rank is 𝑒ଷ.଼ଶା଴.଻ହ = 97. The difference 
is 50 ranks. Hence, for a one rank increase in beauty rank, there is on average a 0.5 rank increase 
in the rank of the college attended.  
White men and women make up the largest part (660/900 = 73%) of the sample. To check for 
racial differences, we separate the sample by White and non-White in Table 5. Column (1) of Table 
5 reveals that the coefficient for beauty rank is not significant for non-White men and is significant 
for White men (0.75). Column (3) reveals that the difference between White and non-White men 
is insignificant. This lack of significance is most likely due to the large standard error for the non-
 
16 Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively nearly identical when we do not use the log transformation. These results are available on 
request.  
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White men revealed in column (1). Columns (4) and (5) shows that the rank of the college attended 
by non-White and White women does not increase with their beauty rank.17  
Observation III. The beauty rank of White male alumni but not White female or non-White 
alumni of either gender increases significantly with the rank of the college 
attended in the US. 
Figure 1 displays the plot of the log rank of the college attended against the beauty rank of 
alumni for White men and women. The right panel shows that the men’s beauty rank 
monotonically increases on the rank of the college attended, whereas the left panel shows that of 
women does not.  
We hypothesize that the correlates of beauty might affect admissions in the US through the 
exercise of discretion as to the merits signaled by extracurricular activities. According to this 
hypothesis, we should find a greater association between the beauty and the college ranks for 
alumni who attended private colleges, which have greater discretion in the interpretation of such 
criteria because they are less regulated. To test this hypothesis, we redo the previous regressions 
by comparing results with and without private colleges (namely, Harvard, Columbia, Penn, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, Boston University, Stevens Institute 
of Technology, Illinois Institute of Technology, and New Jersey Institute of Technology) in Table 
6. The coefficient for beauty rank increases from 0.32 in column (1) for public colleges to 1.74 in 
column (2) for private colleges, suggesting that an incremental increase in the beauty rank is 
associated with a greater increase in the rank of college attended among alumni of private colleges. 
This greater association is confirmed in column (5) with the positive coefficient for the interaction 
of the private dummy variable and beauty rank (1.43) for the full sample of both private and public 
colleges.  
 
17 A-Table 3 shows that the coefficients for non-White races of either gender are negative, but too imprecisely measured to be statistically 
significant. This lack of significance does not seem to be due to the sample sizes being smaller than that of Whites, however. For non-White men 
and women, we have 119 and 121 observations, respectively. Both are nearly twice as large as the number of observations that we have for White 
men in private colleges for column (2) of Table 6, which was still significant at the 5 percent level. However, many of the sample sizes for the 
coefficients for the correlation of disaggregated minorities in columns (3)-(8) are too small to draw any inference. Hence, we make an observation 
for the non-Whites, and merely remark that the disaggregated data is consistent with the aggregate. 
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This finding of a higher slope for the regression of the log of college rank on beauty rank, along 
with a lower intercept for private as compared to publics colleges, raises the possibility that private 
colleges can themselves be more heterogeneous than public colleges in terms of how much the 
correlates of beauty affect the chance of admissions of White men. A potential reason for the 
greater level of heterogeneity among private as compared to public colleges is, higher ranked 
private colleges might use their greater discretion in order to reject more otherwise similarly 
qualified students, while lower ranked private colleges may use their greater discretion to admit 
more marginal candidates.  
To test the hypothesis that higher ranked private colleges are more selective than lower ranked 
private colleges in terms of beauty (or its correlates), we drop subjects from the top-four private 
colleges from our sample: Harvard, Columbia, Penn, MIT, that are ‘top-10’ in column (3), while 
leaving in the bottom-five private colleges in the sample. The coefficient of beauty rank decreases 
from 0.75 in column (2) of Table 5 to 0.23 in column (3) Table 6. If we drop subjects from the 
bottom-four ranked private colleges in our sample: Boston University, Stevens, IIT, and NJIT in 
column (4), the coefficient increases to 0.78. These results are consistent with the possibility that 
beauty or its correlates may have a much larger effect for admissions to the top private colleges 
than to the lower ranked private colleges.  
Columns (6-8) exhibit results for technology colleges, which may rely less than non-technical 
colleges on discretion and more on standardized tests. This conjecture is confirmed by the contrast 
between the significant coefficient for beauty rank (0.84) in column (6) which drops subjects from 
technology colleges and the insignificant coefficient for beauty rank (0.26) in column (7) which 
contains data of subjects only from technology colleges. However, the insignificance of the 
technology beauty rank interaction in column (8) does not give further support. 
Observation IV. The positive correlation between the beauty rank of White male alumni and the 
college they attended is stronger among those who attended private colleges 
and weaker among those who attended technology colleges. 
These findings of no significant correlation between the beauty rank of alumni and the rank of 
their college for students of both genders in China, White women, and non-White minorities of 
both genders and White men in tech colleges in the US, suggests that the correlation we find for 
White men is due to non-academic factors used in the admissions process. We discuss some 
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potential non-academic factors in the admissions process which might interact with the beauty of 
White men, in particular, in Section 5.  
To get a rough sense of the potential impact of the correlates of beauty rank on salary, we 
perform a simple regression of the median and the expected salary (not broken down by race or 
gender) on the rank of the college attended in Table 7. (See A-Table 2 for the salary data.)  
[Insert Table 7] 
Columns (1) and (2) show the mean and median salaries in the 2011 for those who enrolled in 
2001 in the US. Columns (1) and (2) reveals that for the US (starting from the highest-ranking 
university), an incremental decrease in college rank for a student enrolled in 2001 decreases their 
mean salary by approximately 374 USD and median salary by approximately 471 USD per year, 
respectively, in 2011. Thus, a percentage point decrease in beauty rank corresponds to a decrease 
of 0.3 percent in mean (50/100∙(-374/72,991)) and median (50/100∙(-471/78,546)) salaries 10 years 
later. This association, and therefore, potential effect of beauty, is sizeable when compared to prior 
studies which use the coarser ratings: below, at, or above average looks. Our findings suggest that 
a 33 percent increase in beauty rating would result in a 10 percent increase in salary 10 years after 
graduation.  
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
We find the facial beauty rank of alumni of either gender has no economically or statistically 
significant effect on the rank of the college they attended in China (Observation I). The beauty 
rank of male alumni but not female alumni in the US increases on the rank of the college attended 
(Observation II). When the US sample is broken down by race, we find that the beauty rank of 
only White male alumni is significantly associated with the rank of the college attended. The 
beauty rank of White female alumni and non-White alumni of either gender are not significantly 
associated with college rank (Observation III). The association of the beauty rank for White male 
alumni is strongest for higher ranked private colleges, which are presumably less regulated. In 
contrast, the beauty rank of White male alumni from technology colleges has no significant 
association with the rank of the college attended (Observation IV). The association between the 
beauty rank and school attended for White male alumni implies that, an increase in beauty rank of 
33 percent is associated with a 10 percent higher salary 10 years after graduation. This is within 
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5-20 percent range for men (who are mostly White) with above average looks (within above, at, 
or below average looks framework) found in previous studies (A-Table 1).  
Importantly for interpreting these results, our finding in China suggests that beauty is not 
statistically significantly associated with college rank. This outcome suggests that academic 
ability, at least as measured by standardized tests, is not associated with beauty. Our finding that 
the beauty of White women’s and non-Whites of either gender is not correlated with the rank of 
the college they attended in the US suggests, moreover, that academic ability in general, not only 
as measured by standardized tests, but also including that measured by grades, letters of 
recommendation, is also not necessarily associated with beauty. This lack of correlation for White 
women and non-Whites of either gender suggests that the beauty premium we find for White men 
is the result of non-academic factors which might specifically benefit White men in the admissions 
process.  
An important question for the validity of our positive results for White men in the US is whether 
there was self-selection into social media by beauty. It is beyond the scope of this study to address 
this question directly. However, we have a number of benchmarks groups to help mitigate this 
concern. If men tend to self-select into social media by beauty and the rank of their college, we 
would also expect that they would in China. Similarly, we would also expect such self-selection 
for White women, non-White minorities, and White men at technology colleges in the US. But, 
the beauty rank of members of these groups do not exhibit a positive correlation with the college 
they attended. We know of no basis to suggest that only White men who attended non-technology 
colleges in the US would self-select according to their beauty on to social media. Hence, the 
possibility that our results for White men are driven by self-selection seems implausible, or at least, 
less plausible than other alternatives, which we discuss below. 
Another potential issue with our data is reverse causality. We use photos of graduates from 2012. 
The corresponding photos could have been taken in 2012 or even later, and likely much later than 
the year in which the admission decision was made. Consequently, the rank of the college attended 
can potentially affect the beauty rank if the college rank increases salary, and salary increases 
beauty by rendering better grooming and clothing more affordable. Again, if the direction of 
causality were reversed, we should find a similar association between the college rank and beauty 
in China, where graduates of higher ranked colleges earn comparably higher salaries, or for White 
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women, non-White minorities, and White men in technology colleges in the US. However, we find 
no such association for members of these other groups.  
5.1 Favoritism to athletes and the beauty of White men 
As to why better-looking White men in particular may be favored in the admissions process, a 
correspondence study in Israel offers a potential clue (Ruffle and Shtudiner 2015). They find a 
beauty premium for men only, and surprisingly, a beauty penalty for women. Notably, this beauty 
penalty was driven by firms using in-house HR personnel, who they also find, are almost always 
younger women. The authors infer that the bias against hiring more beautiful women is driven by 
female sexual jealousy.  
Such a bias could also exist in the admissions process for elite colleges. The potential favoritism 
of teachers or admissions officers and alumni who interview candidates for better-looking male 
students can help explain our findings for men, especially if the interviewers tend to be female and 
White themselves, given a same-race bias among women (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely 2010a).18 
This possibility of teacher or admissions interviewer bias for better-looking men is especially 
important for elite colleges, like Harvard, which rely heavily upon interviews in the admissions 
process, particularly for athletes (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom 2019). However, there is no 
need to posit a pervasive self-serving taste-based discrimination on the part of the people involved 
in the admissions process to explain our results.  
It is widely known and often openly acknowledged that colleges favor admitting athletes. For 
example, in one survey, 28 percent of four year college admissions directors in the US 
acknowledged using lower standards to admit athletes (Green, Jaschik, and Lederman 2011).  
Colleges do so because they benefit from favoritism to male athletes. High-ability athletes bring 
positive attention to their college by helping to win intercollege sports competitions. Such attention 
increases alumni donations (Anderson 2017; Meer and Rosen 2009), the number (McCormick and 
Tinsley 1987) and quality of applicants (Pope and Pope 2014; Tucker and Amato 2006), and allows 
the university to charge a higher tuition (Alexander and Kern 2009). Moreover, if HR managers at 
elite firms discriminate by athletic ability (Rivera 2011), colleges can improve their placement 
record by discriminating similarly in their admissions decisions.  
 
18 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TCHR.FE.ZS 
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In the case of Harvard, recruited athletes are admitted with drastically lower academic standards. 
Such lower standards result in an admissions rate of 86% for recruited athletes, which is over 14 
times higher than for students who are not recruited athletes. As a consequence, recruited athletes 
make up over 10% of the admitted class though they are 1% of the applicant pool. Importantly for 
explaining our findings, 70% of admitted recruited athletes at Harvard are White (Arcidiacono, 
Kinsler, and Ransom 2019).  
Hence, the favoritism colleges show towards athletes can help explain why we find that White 
men are better-looking in higher ranked colleges in the US, especially at elite private colleges. 
Selecting for top-male athletes may also select for male beauty. The key factor which connects 
athletic ability and male beauty is prenatal exposure to androgens. The second-to-fourth digit 
length ratio (2D:4D) has been proposed as measure of prenatal exposure to androgens. A low 
2D:4D ratio is associated with a large body size (Klimek et al. 2014), greater lean body mass 
(Schroeder et al. 2012), a more dominant personality (Neave et al. 2003), a greater propensity for 
risk taking (Apicella, Carré, and Dreber 2015), success as finance traders (Coates, Gurnell, and 
Rustichini 2009), and a higher level of facial masculinity (Pound, Penton-Voak, and Surridge 
2009). Larger size, leaner body mass, greater risk taking, and more domineering personality likely 
confer advantages in competitive sports. Hence, it has been found that a low 2D:4D ratio is a 
predictor of athletic prowess and success in highly competitive sports (Coates, Gurnell, and 
Rustichini 2009; Hönekopp and Schuster 2010), including within the college varsity sports setting 
(Giffin et al. 2012). Therefore, a preference for admitting male athletes, especially for the most 
popular varsity sports, e.g., football and basketball, likely selects for these physical and 
psychological traits—as well as height. The selection for higher levels of these stereotypically 
male features likely increases with the rank of college, because higher ranked colleges can draw 
from a larger pool of applicants. 
Though the digit ratio of competitive female athletes are also lower than non-athletes (Giffin et 
al. 2012; Hönekopp and Schuster 2010), there is little evidence to suggest that prenatal testosterone 
also contributes to the female facial attractiveness which we measure. We are unaware of any other 
organic connection between traditional female facial attractiveness and athletic ability. Hence, 
given the connection between male athletic ability and male beauty made by male androgens and 
the preponderance of White men among male athletes, the preference colleges show towards 
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athletes can help explain our finding that only White males are better-looking at higher ranked 
colleges in the US, but not White females or minorities. 
In addition to selection for better-looking men through the preference for athletes, universities 
may also implicitly select for better-looking men when they select for applicants with 
demonstrated leadership experience. Leadership contests among high school students may well be 
little more than popularity contests, and beauty increases popularity (Gu and Ji 2019). Moreover, 
athletic ability, height, a large lean body, facial masculinity, and a daring and domineering 
personality, may complement the stereotypically masculine traits of leaders in the West, and 
thereby, contribute to the charisma and confidence expected of leaders, especially among 
adolescents (Mobius and Rosenblat 2006). White students from rich families may be over- 
represented among applying students showing high leadership potential. White students from rich 
families are the majority at elite private high schools. Private high schools are smaller than public 
high schools and tend to have more leadership opportunities (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom 
2019). Thus, another potential reason why we find a significant correlation between the beauty of 
only White men and the rank of the college they attended is that White women and other racial 
minorities may be less able to exploit the favoritism colleges show towards students with 
leadership experience in the admissions process.  
In summary, we do not find a significant correlation between the beauty rank of alumni and the 
rank of the college they graduated from for Chinese students of either gender, White women and 
non-White minorities of either gender, or for White men who graduated from technical colleges. 
In light of the previous finding that intelligence is not correlated with beauty, our finding would 
further suggest that beauty is not correlated with academic ability, as measured by college ranking. 
We do find a significant positive correlation between the beauty of White men and the rank of the 
college they attended, if they attended non-technical public or private colleges, with the strongest 
correlation for those who attended private colleges. We suggest that a potential channel of the 
college admissions contribution to the labor market beauty premium for White men may due the 
favoritism colleges show in the admissions process towards athletes or leaders of high school 
clubs. Our evidence suggests that the labor market beauty premium for men and women in China 
and for White women and non-White minorities of either gender in the West originates in the labor 
market, while that of White men may have a college admissions contribution.  
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FIGURE 1: COLLEGE RANK VS. BEAUTY RANK FOR US WHITE WOMEN 
(LEFT PANEL) AND WHITE MEN (RIGHT PANEL) 
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7 Tables 
TABLE 1: RACE AND AGE CATEGORIZATIONS FOR THE US SAMPLE 
 Number of observations 
 Women Men Total 
Race:    
White 329 331 660 
Black 27 24 51 
Hispanic 35 46 81 
Asian 49 39 88 
Unknown 10 10 20 
Total 450 450 900 
Age range:    
23−26 308 248 556 
27 or older 142 202 344 
Total 450 450 900 
 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PHOTO RATINGS 
Rating Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
China Men 450 0.50 0.19 0 0.95 
China Women 450 0.50 0.22 0 1 
US Men: 450 0.50 0.20 0.05 1 
   White 331 0.52 0.20 0.05 1 
   Non-White 119 0.43 0.19 0.09 0.89 
US Women: 450 0.50 0.20 0 0.95 
   White 329 0.52 0.20 0 .95 
   Non-White 121 0.45 0.19 0.04 0.93 
Notes: Ratings are between 0 and 1, where the rating denotes the percentile of other photos that are less attractive. The max is not always 
1 and the min is not always zero because of ties in the ratings of the most and least attractive, respectively. 
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TABLE 3: FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION 
 Beauty Rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables US Men US Women US China Men China Women China 
       
Older than 27 -0.00 -0.05*** -0.03**    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    
Black -0.04 -0.18*** -0.11***    
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)    
Hispanic -0.04 0.01 -0.02    
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    
Asian -0.16*** -0.09*** -0.12***    
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    
Display rank 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Original random -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Observations 450 450 900 900 900 900 
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Notes: Subject’s beauty rating, 0 ≤ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௜ ≤1, where 1 indicates highest rating, is the dependent variable. ‘Older than 27’ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the subject is older than age 27 and 0, if the subject is between 23-26. Chinese subjects are always between 
23-26 years of age in our sample. Black, Hispanic, and Asian are dummy variables which equal 1 if the subject is one of those races. 
‘Display rank’ is rank of the subject in the search results, based on a random number chosen before the search. Higher rank number 
indicates lower position on the search page. ‘Original random’ takes on the value of 1 if the display rank number is based on the first 
draw and 0 if based on the second draw. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.051. 
 
TABLE 4: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CHINA 
 College Rank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 China Men China Women China US Men US Women US 
       
Beauty rank 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.64** -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.31) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) 
Gender   -0.11   -0.50 
   (0.42)   (0.38) 
Gender*Beauty rank   0.11   0.50 
   (0.41)   (0.37) 
Constant 3.94*** 4.05*** 4.05*** 3.47*** 4.13*** 4.11*** 
 (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.25) 
       
Observations 450 450 900 450 450 900 
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Notes: The dependent variable is 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ is the log of rank of the college that subject 𝑖 attended. A lower number for the college rank implies greater prestige. Beauty rank is the subject’s beauty rank, 0 ≤ 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ ≤1, where lower number indicates greater attractiveness. Gender is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the subject is male and 0, if the subject is female. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.051. 
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TABLE 5: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE US 
 College rank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Non-White Men White Men US Men Non-White Women White Women US Women 
       
Beauty rank 0.42 0.75** 0.75**    
 (0.69) (0.29) (0.29)    
Non-White   -0.13   -0.26 
   (0.43)   (0.37) 
Non-White*Beauty rank   -0.33    
   (0.75)    
Constant    -0.18 0.04 0.04 
    (0.62) (0.25) (0.25) 
      -0.23 
Observations      (0.67) 
R-squared 3.68*** 3.82*** 3.82*** 3.93*** 4.19*** 4.19*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜, which is the log of rank of the college (1-200) that subject 𝑖 attended. A lower number for the college rank implies greater prestige. Beauty rank is the subject’s beauty rank, 0 ≤ 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ ≤1, where lower number indicates greater attractiveness. ‘Non-White’ is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the subject is not White and zero 
otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.051. 
TABLE 6: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE US WHITE MEN 
 College Rank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Public Private Drop Top 
Private 
Drop Bot 
Private 
Public vs 
Private 
Non-Tech Tech Tech vs 
Non-Tech 
         
Beauty rank 0.32** 1.74** 0.23* 0.78*** 0.32** 0.84*** 0.26 0.84*** 
 (0.14) (0.75) (0.13) (0.29) (0.14) (0.32) (0.63) (0.32) 
Private     -2.46***    
     (0.42)    
Private*Beauty rank     1.43*    
     (0.76)    
Tech        0.22 
        (0.39) 
Tech*Beauty rank        -0.58 
        (0.70) 
Constant 4.43*** 1.97*** 4.45*** 3.79*** 4.43*** 3.78*** 4.00*** 3.78*** 
 (0.08) (0.42) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) (0.19) (0.34) (0.19) 
         
Observations 256 75 283 319 331 265 66 331 
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.50 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Notes: The dependent variable is 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜, the log of rank of the college (1-200) that subject 𝑖 attended. A lower number for the college rank implies greater prestige. Beauty rank is the subject’s beauty rank, 0 ≤ 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ ≤1, where lower number indicates greater attractiveness. Private is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the subject attended a private college and zero otherwise. 
Tech is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the subject attended a technology college and zero otherwise. Column (1) uses 
data only from public colleges. Column (2) uses data only from private colleges. Column (3) drops the top-4 private colleges. Column 
(4) drops the bottom-4 private colleges. Column (5) uses the full data set for White men and includes the private college dummy along 
with its interaction with beauty rank. Column (6) uses data only from non-technology colleges. Column (7) uses data only from 
technology colleges. Column (8) uses the full data set for White men and includes the technology college dummy along with its 
interaction with beauty rank. The control variables include the display rank (the position of the profile in the search result) and the age. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.051. 
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TABLE 7: REGRESSION RESULTS OF STARTING SALARY ON COLLEGE RANK 
 US Salary 
 (1) (2) 
 Mean Median 
   
Rank -374.58*** -471.07*** 
 (107.36) (130.14) 
Rank2 1.30** 1.65** 
 (0.56) (0.67) 
Constant 72,991.31*** 78,546.71*** 
 (3,903.65) (5,173.70) 
   
Observations 30 30 
R-squared 0.46 0.50 
Notes: The mean and median salary data is the salary of alumni in 2011 who enrolled in 2001 listed in A-Table 2. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8 Appendix 
A-TABLE 1: EFFECT OF BEAUTY ON WAGES ACROSS COUNTRIES*  
Country Paper Gender Occupation 
Wage effect 
Notes Above-average 
looks (%) 
Below-average 
looks (%) 
Canada & US Hamermesh & Biddle (1994) 
Men General 5.4 -8.9 Stacked estimates Women 3.9 -5.5 
US Mocan & Tekin (2010) 
Men General 10.8 -7  Women 4.5 -7 
United 
Kingdom Harper (2000) 
Men General Not significant -14.9  Women Not significant -10.9 
Netherland Pfann et al. (2000) Both 
Advertising 
Firm 
18000 DFL increase in wage with 
average beauty changes from 10th 
to 90th percentile (assuming a 7.5% 
effect on wages averaging 150000 
DFL per year) 
Wage effect 
inferred from 
extraneous 
estimates 
China 
(Shanghai) 
Hamermesh et 
al. (2002) 
Men General - -  Women 17.9 - 
Brazil Sachsida et al. (2011) 
Men Salesmen Not significant Not significant  Women 9 Not significant 
Germany 
Doorley & 
Sierminska 
(2012) 
Men 
General 
14 - 
 
Women 20 - 
Luxembourg 
Doorley & 
Sierminska 
(2012) 
Men 
General 
-3 - 
 
Women 10 - 
Australia in 
1984 
Borland & 
Leigh (2014) 
Men General 11.6 Not significant  Women Not significant Not significant 
Australia in 
2009 
Borland & 
Leigh (2014) 
Men General Not significant -12.9  Women Not significant Not significant   
 
* Reproduced from Liu and Sierminska (2015). 
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A-TABLE 2: RANK AND SALARIES FOR US UNIVERSITIES 
Name State US News rank Mean starting salary Median starting salary 
Harvard University MA 2 $74,469  $87,200  
Columbia University NY 4 $75,676  $72,900  
University of Pennsylvania PA 8 $68,816  $78,200  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology MA 7 $83,418  $91,600  
New York University NY 32 $60,530  $58,800  
Georgia Institute of Technology GA 35 $43,259  $41,500  
University of California-Davis CA 38 $50,971  $57,100  
Boston University  MA 42 $66,818  $67,000  
University of Florida  FL 48 $53,141  $51,300  
University of Texas–Austin TX 53 $54,495  $52,800  
University of Georgia GA 62 $52,772  $46,500  
University of Iowa IA 71 $45,999  $48,700  
University of Massachusetts-Amherst MA 76 $51,204  $49,600  
Stevens Institute of Technology NJ 76 $75,347  $82,800  
University of Vermont VT 85 $37,139  $44,000  
Florida State University  FL 95 $46,005  $44,000  
University of Missouri MO 99 $46,141  $46,000  
University at Buffalo-SUNY  NY 103 $50,187  $49,700  
University of Tennessee TN 106 $42,580  $42,300  
Illinois Institute of Technology IL 116 $69,999  $68,200  
University of Arizona AZ 121 $43,698  $44,400  
University of Arkansas-Fayetteville AR 135 $46,247  $43,600  
Oklahoma State University  OK 145 $45,431  $43,400  
Texas Tech University TX 156 $47,291  $46,100  
San Diego State University CA 149 $46,622  $48,700  
New Jersey Institute of Technology NJ 149 $64,065  $65,300  
Mississippi State University MS 156 $42,506  $39,600  
University of Idaho ID 166 $38,390  $39,900  
University of Central Florida FL 173 $46,925  $43,000  
Southern Illinois University -Carbondale IL 189 $42,740  $41,500  
Notes: The mean and median salary data is the salary of alumni in 2011 who enrolled in 2001. The mean salary is the expected salary 
in 2011 calculated by The Economist, using a number of controls, based on data from the US Department of Education College Scorecard. 
We collected this data from The Economist magazine’s website:  http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/10/value-
university 
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A-TABLE 3: WITHIN GENDER REGRESSION RESULTS FOR US NON-WHITES 
Dependent 
variable College rank 
 Non-White Black Hispanic Asian 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
         
Beauty rank -0.177 -0.263 -0.441 -1.901 0.158 0.666 1.770 -0.321 
 (0.668) (0.625) (0.839) (1.629) (1.172) (0.963) (1.155) (1.027) 
Observations 119 121 24 27 46 35 39 49 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.039 0.000 0.009 0.050 0.003 
Notes: The dependent variable is 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜, the log of rank of the college (1-200) that subject 𝑖 attended. A lower number for the college rank implies greater prestige. Beauty rank is the subject’s beauty rank, 0 ≤ 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ ≤1, where lower number indicates greater attractiveness. Black, Hispanic, and Asian are dummy variables which equal 1 if the subject is one of those races. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
